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Abstract  The Domain Name System is a distributed tree
based database The DNS
protocol is largely used to translate a human readable machine name into an IP address
The DNS security extensions DNSSEC has been designed to protect the DNS protocol
DNSSEC uses public key cryptography and digital signatures A secure DNS zone owns
at least a key pair publicprivate to provide two security services data integrity and
authentication To trust some DNS data a DNS client has to verify the signature of this
data with the right zone key This verication is based on the establishment of a chain of
trust between secure zones To build this chain of trust a DNSSEC client needs a secure
entry point a zone key congured as trusted in the client And then the client must nd
a secure path from a secure entry point to the queried DNS resource Zone keys are critical
in DNSSEC and are used in every steps of a name resolution In this report we present
a study on consequences of a compromised key in DNSSEC We describe compromised key
attacks and we present current defenses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Cons quences de cl s de zone compromises dans
DNSSEC
Rsum   Le syt me de noms de domaine est une base de donne distribue base sur un
mod le arborescent Le protocole DNS est largement utilis pour eectuer essentiellement
la correspondance entre un nom de machine et son adresse IP Les extensions de scurit du
DNS DNSSEC ont t conues pour protger ce protocole Pour cela DNSSEC utilise la
cryptographie  cl publique ainsi que des signatures numriques Une zone DNSSEC pos

s de au moins une paire de cls publiqueprive pour signer ses donnes DNS et fournir
ainsi deux services de scurit essentiels  lintgrit et lauthenticit des donnes Pour faire
conance  des donnes DNS un client DNSSEC doit en vrier les signatures numriques
avec la cl de zone approprie Cette vrication est base sur ltablissement dune chane
de conance entre des zones scurises Pour construire cette chane le client a besoin dun
point dentre scuris  une cl de zone congure dans le client comme cl de conance
Puis le client doit trouver un chemin scuris partant de ce point jusquaux donnes DNS
demandes Les cls de zones sont essentielles au fonctionnement de DNSSEC et sont util

ises dans toutes les tapes dune rsolution de nom Dans ce papier nous prsentons une
tude des consquences dune cl compromise sur le protocole DNSSEC Nous dcrivons les
attaques pouvant tre mener grce  une cl compromise et nous prsentons les dfenses
possibles
Mots cls   DNSSEC compromission de cl securit rseau
Compromised keys in DNSSEC 	
 Introduction
The Domain Name System DNS Moca Mocb AL is a hierarchical distributed
database mostly used to translate host names into IP addresses The DNS protocol does
not include any security services such as data integrity and authentication which lets some
vulnerabilities in the protocol Bel Sch	 AA Therefore the Internet Engineering
Task Force IETF has developed the DNS security extensions DNSSEC
DNSSEC Eas Gun	 AAL
 
a AAL
 
c AAL
 
b uses public
key cryptography
to provide DNS data integrity and authentication Each node of the DNS tree called a zone
owns at least a key pair used to generate digital signatures of the DNS zone information
The basic data unit of this information is a resource record RR Each RR has a particular
type that indicates which kind of data it contains For example a DNSKEY RR contains a
zone key a RRSIG RR contains a signature and an A RR contains an IPv address
In order to trust DNS data a resolver the DNS client builds a chain of trust Gie
by walking through the DNS tree from a secure entry point KSL i e  a trusted key
statically congured in the resolver typically a top level zone to the queried resource
record A resolver is able to build a chain of trust if it owns a secure entry point and if there
are only secure zones on the path from the secure entry point to the queried zone
In this paper we describe in Section  DNSSEC principles dierent types of keys and the
signature verication process Then in Section 	 we study consequences of a compromised
key in DNSSEC Finally in Section  we present current defenses after a key compromission
 DNSSEC architecture and secure name resolution
The Domain Name System DNS is a distributed tree
based database The DNS tree is
divided into domains and zones
  Domains and zones
A domain is a subtree of the DNS tree The name of a domain is the concatenation of all
nodes label from the root of the subtree to the root of the DNS tree Since two nodes
having the same parent node have a dierent label unicity of domain names is ensured A
domain can be include in another domain for example the irisa fr  domain is include in
the fr  domain as shown on Figure 
Each domain is constituted of one or several zones The zone is the administrative unit
of the DNS and is represented by a node in the DNS tree A zone is managed by one or
several name servers that store the zone information in a zone le This zone le contains
all the zone resource records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Figure  DNS domains and DNS zones
   DNS entities
Three entities with distinct roles are present in the DNS architecture the authoritative
name server the cache server and the resolver see AL
 The authoritative name server
The name server is authoritative on a DNS zone It stores resource records in its zone le
Every resource record is associated to a DNS name The name server receives DNS queries
about a DNS name and replies with resource records contained in its zone le
 The cache server
A cache server is not authoritative on any zone It is generally located on a local network
to receive queries from local resolvers A cache server sends responses to these queries
using resource records it previously received If the cache server does not have the answer
it forwards the query to the most appropriated authoritative server it knows Then it
receives a DNS responses keeps a copy in memory and sends it to the resolver that has
previously launched the name resolution Using cache servers allows to minimize the burden
on authoritative servers Sit JSBM CK
 The resolver
The resolver is the local entity that receives requests from applications and sends DNS
queries to name servers or cache servers After having performed the name resolution the
resolver returns the answer to the application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  DNSSEC chain of trust
DNS security extensions use public key cryptography and dene new resource records to
store keys and signatures Each secure zone owns one or several zone keys The public part
of each key is stored in a DNSKEY resource record The private part of a zone key is kept
secret and should be stored in a secure location This private part is used to generate a
digital signature of each resource record in the zone le Then each signature is stored in
a RRSIG resource record To trust a resource record a resolver must verify at least one
signature of this resource record with a trusted zone key
 Two types of DNSSEC keys
There is two way for a resolver to trust a zone key Either this key is congured in the
resolver this is a trusted key also called a secure entry point or the resolver trusts a DS
resource record Gun	 that authenticates this key A DS RR is a resource record stored
in the parent zone that authenticates a key of the child zone Basically a DS RR contains
a key identier and a hash of a child zone public key The DS RR is signed by parent zone
keys
A DS resource record creates a secure link between a parent zone and its child zone
together with a dependency Indeed when a key is renewed in the child zone the DS RR
must be renewed in the parent zone This implies a communication between the child zone
and the parent zone To minimize the burden due to this additional data exchange some
keys do not have an associated DS RR The Delegation Signer DS model introduces a
distinction between two types of keys the Key Signing Keys KSK and the Zone Signing
Keys ZSK A KSK has an associated DS RR in the parent zone and signs only DNSKEY
resource records A ZSK does not have any associated DS RR and signs all resource records
in the zone le
Even though DS identies two roles for keys KSK and ZSK there is no requirement
that zone uses two dierent keys for these roles It is expected that many small zones will
only use one key while larger zones will more likely use multiple keys Gun	
 DNSSEC signature verication process
To decrease the size of the zone le resource record associated to the same name and
having the same type are grouped and signed together For example if a zone owns three
DNSKEY RRs these three RRs are grouped in a DNSKEY RRset or keyset Then
each key generates a signature for this DNSKEY RRset Hence we have three signatures
associated to the DNSKEY RRset The verication of only one signature is sucient to
trust the DNSKEY RRset and hence the three keys it contains
During a secure name resolution a resolver builds a chain of trust that is to say it starts
from a trusted key and follows the path to the queried resource records while verifying
signatures of resource records and secure link represented by DS
DNSKEY records
Figure  shows dierent steps a DNSSEC client having only the root zone key congured
as secure entry point SEP follows to trust a resource record of the irisa fr  zone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Figure  Chain of trust establishment
At each step we have the same scheme a DS resource record allows to trust a KSK a
KSK allows to trust all the zone key KSK and ZSK and ZSK allow to trust other resource
records of the zone
After having presented the principles of DNS security extensions we analyze conse

quences of a compromised key in DNSSEC and threats induced by the DNSSEC tree
based
architecture
 Consequences of a compromised key
Key revocation is an expensive service that at least one party will have to pay for In some
circumstances it may be economically preferable to accept the risk of not having a ne

grained revocation service and to require key holding parties to adequately protect their
private keys a route that DNSSEC protocol designers have pursued There are currently
no practical revocation services provided by DNSSEC supporting infrastructures Cha	
There are several way to compromise a key The rst one is cryptanalysis A mali

cious person gets the private part of a public key only with mathematical knowledges and
cryptographical material generated by the key or using vulnerabilities in keys or digital
signatures generator This kind of attack is dicult because cryptographic algorithms and
protocols were designed to resist to cryptanalysis For information the theoretical time to
cryptanalyze a RSA key usually used in DNSSEC today is given in table  Odl
Basically private parts of DNSSEC zone keys are stored on a secure location disconnected
of any network If this is not the case a second way to compromise a key is to access to the
private key from the network bypassing all security
The third possibility is simply when the attacker has a physical access the private keys
The attacker could be for example a dishonest or dissatised zone administrator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RSA key size bits MIPSyear
   

  

   

  

	   

   

Table  RSA key theoretical cryptanalysis time depending on the key size
Because of the DNS tree
based architecture when a zone is compromised all zones in
the subdomain of the compromised zone are potentially threatened An attacker with a
compromised zone key can forge resource records cryptographically correct
We suppose that a zone owns those two types of keys KSK and ZSK This distinction
allows to ease the study without loss of generality If one key is used as KSK and ZSK at
the same time all properties apply to this key
 A ZSK is compromised
When a ZSK is compromised the attacker that owns the private part of the key can generate
digital signatures for any forged resource records We can notice that signatures generated
by the attacker can be veried with the compromised ZSK This ZSK is itself authenticated
by KSKs of the zone because of the existing chain of trust between the zone and its parent
zone Then the attacker has no need to compromise a KSK of the zone
  A KSK is compromised
When a KSK is compromise the attacker can create and signs DNSKEY RR Nevertheless
as limiting the scope of a zone key is not a protocol requirement the attacker can use this
KSK to sign other types of resource records As this KSK has an associated DS RR in its
parent zone this compromised KSK is authenticated by a chain of trust
 Example of compromised key attack
Assuming the attacker has compromised a key we suppose the general case where the
attacker has no write access to the zone le As the attacker can not reach the source of the
DNS data the zone le its target will be to put forged RRs in cache servers Hence these
false informations will be sent to resolvers by cache servers This cache pollution becomes
as easy as with the DNS protocol because all the cryptographic material provided by the
attacker is correct LMMM GC	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Indeed a cache server accepts DNSSEC resource records only if it is capable of building
a chain of trust and verifying signatures However the chain of trust exists and the attacker
can generate signatures of forged records with the compromised key
DNS messages are identied by a  bits identier in the header of the message This
identier is set in the query and the associated answer have the same Resolvers having
multiple query waiting at the same time this identier allows to associate an answer with
a query So the only diculty for the attacker is to force a cache to send a query and then
to nd the good identier to answer
To force the cache server to send a query the attacker just has to send this query to the
cache Then the cache behavior is to forward the query to the appropriate authoritative
server Obtaining the good identier is not a problem because of a birthday paradox with
identiers It is proved that with only 	 messages the attacker has more than ! chances
to nd the good identier
With this kind of attack an attacker can put in a cache server forged records and for
example attribute false IP addresses to a web server a banking account consultation web
server
In the next Section we present the way an administrator should follow to defend against
compromised key attack
 Current defenses against compromised key attacks
The rst thing we can notice to defend against a compromised key is that the administrator
must know one of its keys is compromised This is not obvious because as we have seen tar

gets of attacks are cache servers and not authoritative servers manage by the administrator
Moreover the administrator can only act on its own servers not on the polluted cache
 Defenses against a compromised KSK
When a zone administrator gures out that one of its key is compromised he removes
immediately this key from its zone le and as the DNSKEY RRset group of DNSKEY
RRs has changed he signs the zone le Nevertheless this is not sucient to stop an
attack because of the existing chain of trust DS
DNSKEY pair between the parent zone
and its child zone as shown on Figure 	 This chain of trust allows to authenticate the
compromised key
Part a of the gure 	 shows the state of the child zone le the state of the parent zone
le and the state of the cache server memory This cache is not polluted To protect its
zone the child zone administrator has removed the compromised key KSK and has signed
its zone le A resolver sending a query to this cache server will obtain a DNSKEY RRset
with KSK and ZSK keys deployed in the zone
Part b of the gure 	 shows the state of the cache server when the pollution attack
succeeds We notice that even if the compromised key is removed from the zone le it
remains in the cache server Hence even if parent and child zone les are in a consistent
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Figure 	 States of child zone le parent zone le and cache server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state a resolver sending a query to the cache server will receive the compromised key KSK
and signatures generated by KSK Then this resolver can build a chain of trust including
DSKSK and KSK authenticating the compromised key and forged RR signed by this
key Remove the compromised key is not sucient because of the DS record authenticating
the compromised key ant then the existence of a chain of trust
To remove this chain of trust the associated DS RR must be removed too as soon as
possible Nevertheless Figure  shows this does not stop the attack immediately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Figure  Cache pollution when compromised keys and DS are removed from zone les
When the attacker pollutes a cache server he adds this DS RR to the pollution message
to bypass the DS RR removing Consequently a resolver sending a query to this polluted
cache server can build a chain of trust authenticating the compromised key This is due
to that something true in DNSSEC a RR and its signature at a time is true until the
signature expiration and to the multiple way to build a chain of trust each DS
DNSKEY
pair Hence a cache pollution attack remains valid until
max
k K p P
expirationRRSIGDNSKEY RRset
k
 expirationRRSIGDS
c

p

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where K is the set of KSKs of the zone that are not compromised P is the set of ZSKs of
the parent zone DS
c
the DS RR authenticating to the compromised key and expiration is
the expiration date of the signature This formula means the expiration of signatures of all
DS
DNSKEY pair representing a chain of trust After this delay the only signature the
attacker can create is generated with the compromised key As all chain of trust have been
removed a resolver cannot authenticate the compromised key The compromised key has
become useless
  Defenses against a compromised ZSK
When a ZSK is compromised even if the compromised key is removed from the zone le
a resolver using the polluted cache server i e  containing the old DNSKEY RRset with
the compromised key could use the compromised key until signatures generated by KSKs
expire We can notice that there is no need to remove KSK or DS from the zone le Once
the compromised ZSK is removed the DNSKEY RRset is modied and hence signatures
too see paragraph 	 Consequently the attack will succeed until all old DNSKEY
signatures expiration that is to say
max
k K
expirationRRSIGDNSKEY RRset
k

where K is the set of KSK and expiration is the expiration date of the signature
This formula means the expiration of all signatures generated by a KSK and hence means
the deletion of all chain of trust authenticating the compromised key As the attacker cannot
generate a new signature of the DNSKEY RRset with a key having an associated DS RR
a KSK after the expiration of signatures the compromised key becomes useless
The validity period of a signature KG is generally one week or one month depending
on the key type and the key lifespan is one month for a ZSK and one year for a KSK It
appears that the time an attacker has to launch attacks with a compromised key is not
negligible
 Conclusion
The DNS security extensions DNSSEC are based on public
key cryptography In this
paper we focused on consequences of a compromised key in DNSSEC It appears that this
is a problem with major impact because of the tree architecture of the DNS When a zone
key is compromised all zones having the compromised zone as ancestor are threatened
The attacker that owns a compromised key of a zone can forge resource records for any of
its subzone and then pollute recursive cache servers with these records Moreover even if
the compromised key is immediately removed from its zone le the compromised RR may
remain in cache servers for a long time In this paper we have given formulas to nd the
period during which a cache pollution attack with a compromised key can succeed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